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Abstract: G.A. Cohen conceptualizes socialism as luck egalitarianism 
constrained by a community principle. The latter mitigates certain 
inequalities to achieve a shared common life. This article explores the 
plausibility of the community constraint on inequality in light of two 
related problems. First, if it is voluntary, it fails as a response to “the 
abandonment objection” to luck egalitarianism, as it would not 
guarantee imprudent people sufficient resources to avoid deprivation 
and to function as equal citizens in a democratic society. Contra 
Cohenite socialism, this appears unjust. Second, if it is instead 
enforced, coercive equalization beyond sufficiency-constrained luck 
egalitarianism, which is possibly necessary to achieve a shared 
common life, seems to require unjustified restrictions on liberty. I 
therefore argue that the constraint is most plausibly specified as 
requiring enforcement of sufficiency and only voluntary equalization 
thereafter. I also note, skeptically, why this constraint might be morally 
preferable to a purely sufficientarian alternative. 
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Introduction 
 
n Why Not Socialism? G.A. Cohen attempts to defend the desirability and 
feasibility of a conception of socialism that is embodied by an egalitarian 
principle and a community principle. The former Cohen calls “socialist 
equality of opportunity,” which is more commonly known as “luck 
egalitarianism” and sometimes as “responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism.” It 
“seeks to correct for all unchosen disadvantages, disadvantages, that is, for 
which the agent cannot herself reasonably be held responsible, whether they 
be disadvantages that reflect social misfortune or disadvantages that reflect 
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natural misfortune.”1 Thus, unlike in contemporary capitalist societies, where 
distributive shares are influenced by the socio-economic circumstances into 
which people are born and raised, as well as by differences in people’s natural 
abilities and their market value, “[w]hen socialist equality of opportunity 
prevails, differences of outcome reflect nothing but differences of taste and 
choice,” made against a background of equal options, for which people “may 
therefore reasonably be held responsible.”2 
Socialist equality of opportunity is consistent with two forms of 
inequality. The first form of inequality occurs when people’s different 
choices, such as about how many hours to work and how much to consume, 
result in inequalities of resources, yet the satisfaction of their different 
preferences “leads to a comparable aggregate enjoyment of life.”3 Cohen deems 
this form of inequality “unproblematic because it does not constitute an 
inequality, all things considered.”4 The second form of inequality comes in 
two subtypes, inequalities that occur due to “regrettable choice” and 
inequalities that occur due to “option luck.” These subtypes are not mutually 
exclusive and both are problematic as they do involve inequality of aggregate 
benefit. Regrettable choice inequalities occur when people make genuine 
choices, for example, to expend less effort and/or care in examining their 
occupational opportunities, which they retrospectively regret due to the 
inequality of aggregate benefit they incur.5 Option luck inequalities are 
inequalities of aggregate benefit that result from people’s genuine choices to 
participate in gambles that they either win or lose, and which losers might 
not necessarily regret if their chances of winning were reasonable.6 
But why should we consider these inequalities problematic if people 
can reasonably be held responsible for their relative advantage or 
disadvantage? Cohen’s worry is that they potentially undermine community. 
As he puts it: 
 
Although [regrettable choice and/or option luck] 
inequalities … are not condemned by justice [because 
                                                 
1 G.A. Cohen, Why Not Socialism? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 17-
18. See also G.A. Cohen, “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice,” in Ethics, 99:4 (1989). 
2 Cohen, Why Not Socialism? 18, 26. For a survey of the literature on luck egalitarianism, 
see Carl Knight, “Luck Egalitarianism,” in Philosophy Compass, 8:10 (2013). 
3 Cohen, Why Not Socialism? 19. 
4 Ibid., 25. 
5 Ibid., 26-28. 
6 Ibid., 30-32. Influenced by Ronald Dworkin, luck egalitarians distinguish between 
“option luck” and “brute luck.” As Dworkin draws the distinction in “What is Equality? Part 2: 
Equality of Resources,” in Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10:4 (1981), 293: “Option luck is a matter 
of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out—whether someone gains or loses through 
accepting an isolated risk he or she should have anticipated and might have declined. Brute luck 
is a matter of how risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate gambles.” 
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they are responsibility-sensitive], they are nevertheless 
repugnant to socialists when they obtain on a 
sufficiently large scale, because they then contradict 
community: community is put under strain when large 
inequalities obtain. The sway of socialist equality of 
opportunity must therefore be tempered by a principle 
of community.7 
 
This article explores the plausibility of Cohen’s community constraint on luck 
egalitarianism, and in doing so reveals its demandingness compared to a 
more commonly embraced sufficiency constraint. I begin by clarifying that it 
requires resource sharing and avoidance of option luck that constrains the 
relevant inequalities to the extent that people share in a common life, 
understood as the lives of the worst off not laboring under many more 
challenges than those of the best off. This clarificatory task partly involves 
questioning some interpretations in the literature that associate the constraint 
with Cohen’s concepts of “justificatory community” and “egalitarian ethos,” 
which feature in his critique of John Rawls. Following this clarificatory work, 
I proceed to investigate the plausibility of the constraint in light of two related 
problems. First, if the constraint is voluntary, it fails as a response to “the 
abandonment objection” to luck egalitarianism, as it would not guarantee 
imprudent people sufficient resources to avoid deprivation and to function 
as equal citizens in a democratic society. Contra Cohenite socialism, this 
appears unjust. Second, if the constraint is instead enforced, coercive 
equalization of resources beyond sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism, 
which is possibly necessary to achieve a shared common life, seems to require 
unjustified restrictions on liberty. I therefore argue that the community 
constraint is most plausibly specified as requiring enforcement of sufficiency 
and only voluntary equalization of resources thereafter. I finish by briefly 
noting, with some skepticism, two possible reasons why this version of the 
constraint might be morally preferable to a purely sufficientarian alternative. 
 
The Community Constraint 
 
Cohen describes the community principle in terms of “two modes of 
communal caring.”8 The second type of caring, which he calls “communal 
reciprocity,” involves human relationships taking a certain desirable form, 
where people give not because of what they can get in return, but because 
others need or want, and where there is an expectation of comparable 
                                                 
7 Cohen, Why Not Socialism? 34. 
8 Ibid., 35. 
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generosity throughout society.9 This resembles the distributive principle of 
higher communism, where “society inscribe on its banners: from each 
according to his ability, to each according to his needs!”10 Indeed, the 
influence of Marx is apparent in the fact that Cohen elsewhere describes the 
relationship between people under the Marxist principle in almost identical 
terms to how he describes it under communal reciprocity; the only significant 
difference is that the latter incorporates a caveat against free riding.11 
 However, communal reciprocity “is not strictly required for 
equality,” despite its “supreme importance in the socialist conception.”12 In 
other words, the community principle’s second mode of caring is not a 
necessary condition of the restriction it places on regrettable choice and/or 
option luck inequalities. Rather, it is the principle’s first mode of caring that 
primarily functions as the constraint.13 Cohen’s description of it is somewhat 
underdeveloped. Interpretations are typically drawn from the following 
passage: 
 
We cannot enjoy full community, you and I, if you make, 
and keep, say, ten times as much money as I do, because 
my life will then labor under challenges that you will 
never face, challenges that you could help me to cope 
with, but do not, because you keep your money. To 
illustrate. I am rich, and I live an easy life, whereas you 
are poor, because of regrettable choices and/or bad 
option luck, and not, therefore because of any lack of 
equality of opportunity. You have to ride the crowded 
bus every day, whereas I pass you by in my comfortable 
car. One day, however, I must take the bus, because my 
wife needs the car. I can reasonably complain about that 
to a fellow car-driver, but not to you. I can’t say to you: 
“It’s awful that I have to take the bus today.” There is a 
lack of community between us of just the sort that 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 38-45. 
10 Karl Marx, “Critique of the Gotha Programme,” in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. 
by David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 569. 
11 Cohen on the Marxist principle: “Here the relationship between people is not the 
instrumental one in which I give because I get, but the wholly non-instrumental one in which I 
give because you need.” This description is from G.A. Cohen, “Back to Socialist Basics,” in On 
the Currency of Egalitarian Justice and Other Essays in Political Philosophy, ed. by Michael Otsuka 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 219. Cohen on communal reciprocity in Why 
Not Socialism? 43: “The relationship between us under communal reciprocity is not the market-
instrumental one in which I give because I get, but the noninstrumental one in which I give 
because you need, or want, and in which I expect a comparable generosity from you.” 
12 Cohen, Why Not Socialism? 35. 
13 Ibid., 35. 
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naturally obtains between me and the fellow car-driver. 
And it will show itself in many other ways, for we enjoy 
widely different powers to care for ourselves, to protect 
and care for offspring, to avoid danger, and so on.14 
 
Taking this passage together with what was established at the outset, it 
appears that Cohen views large inequalities of resources as problematic if 
they reflect people’s regrettable choices and/or option luck, because 
considerable differences of economic power then typically amount to large 
inequalities of aggregate benefit, in the sense that the worst off face many 
more challenges in life than the best off. This outcome conflicts with 
community, as Cohen conceives it, because community involves people 
caring for each other to the extent that they share in a common life, 
understood as the lives of the worst off not laboring under significantly more 
challenges than those of the best off. 
This interpretation is consistent with a second example provided 
almost immediately after the above passage. Imagine you are on a camping 
trip with Cohen and some mutual friends. Imagine further that you have 
access to a high-grade fishpond, which you won in a lottery that everyone 
entered, but that you selfishly decide not to share it. As a result, whilst you 
get fat on exorbitant amounts of fish, the rest of the group has little to eat.15 
This large inequality of resources, which is due to option luck, conflicts with 
community, because community would involve the group caring for each 
other by sharing the pond. As Cohen says of the outcome, “even though there 
is no injustice here, your luck cuts you off from our common life, and the ideal 
of community condemns that, and therefore also condemns the running of 
any such lottery.”16 
Contrary to an alternative interpretation, it is also the non-realization 
of a common life that is fundamental in the bus case. Nicholas Vrousalis 
thinks it is plausible to assume “that the idea of community at work in the 
passage above is, or partakes of, justificatory community.”17 The community 
principle’s first mode of caring is, he says, “something like justificatory 
community.”18 Cohen’s concept of “justificatory community” is developed in 
his sustained critical engagement with Rawls, definitively presented in 
Rescuing Justice and Equality. It is realized when policy arguments pass “the 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 35-36. 
15 Ibid., 37-38. 
16 Ibid., 38. 
17 Nicholas Vrousalis, “Jazz Bands, Camping Trips and Decommodification: G. A. 
Cohen on Community,” in Socialist Studies, 8:1 (2012), 154. See also Nicholas Vrousalis, The 
Political Philosophy of G. A. Cohen: Back to Socialist Basics (London: Bloomsbury, 2015). 
18 Vrousalis, “Jazz Bands, Camping Trips and Decommodification,” 156. 
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interpersonal test,” which “asks whether the argument could serve as a 
justification of a mooted policy when uttered by any member of society to 
any other member.”19 
However, if the interpersonal test were employed in the bus case it 
would not obviously reveal a lack of justificatory community. Unlike in the 
case used to criticize the lax interpretation of Rawls’ difference principle for 
licensing unequalizing incentive payments, where naturally talented 
individuals struggle to justify to the least-advantaged their intention to work 
less hard in the face of an income tax rise, the car-driver could justify his 
relative advantage to the bus-rider on the basis that it is responsibility-
sensitive.20 It thus seems equally plausible to assume that the bus case is not 
meant to illustrate a lack of justificatory community; Richard Miller denies 
that Cohen’s evocations of community in Why Not Socialism? concern it.21 
Rather, what matters is that, unless the car-driver shares his greater resources 
with the bus-rider, considerable inequality of resources prevents them from 
sharing in a common life.22 The unreasonableness of the car-driver’s 
complaint if it was uttered to the bus-rider, but not the fellow car-driver, is 
simply an illustration of the fact that the bus-rider faces significantly more 
challenges in life, and the corresponding improbability that she would 
empathize. 
What Cohen finds repugnant about the worst off facing many more 
challenges than the best off, at least in cases where those challenges could be 
prevented or alleviated to the relevant degree (challenges of severe physical 
and/or mental impairment, for example, cannot always be prevented or so 
alleviated), is that it reflects a lack of caring and sharing. It is reasonably clear, 
given the above illustrations of its non-realization, that the community 
principle’s first mode of caring involves people sharing resources to the 
extent that a common life obtains. For example, to invoke the beginning of 
the passage above, its realization would involve you not keeping all of your 
money if you earn, say, ten times as much as I do, but you instead sharing 
your greater resources with me, to the extent that I do not face considerably 
more challenges in life than you. It would involve rich car-drivers sharing 
their greater resources not merely to the end that buses cease to be 
overcrowded, but to the extent that there ceases to be rich car-drivers and 
poor bus-riders, since transport is only one example of how greatly different 
                                                 
19 G.A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2008), 42. 
20 For the former case, see ibid., 48-69. 
21 Richard W. Miller, “Relationships of Equality: A Camping Trip Revisited,” in The 
Journal of Ethics, 14:3-4 (2010), 249. 
22 See ibid., 249-250; Pablo Gilabert, “Cohen on Socialism, Equality and Community,” 
in Socialist Studies, 8:1 (2012), 105; Christine Sypnowich, “G. A. Cohen’s Socialism: Scientific But 
Also Utopian,” in Socialist Studies, 8:1 (2012), 27-28. 
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economic power cuts people off from a shared common life. Condemnation 
of the fishpond lottery on the camping trip suggests it would also involve 
people avoiding option luck that could lead to the undesired state of affairs. 
It is unclear whether the community principle’s first mode of caring 
is voluntary or enforced. Miriam Ronzoni interprets it as voluntary and 
suggests that, in addition to resource sharing, it “might entail … that the 
naturally talented freely choose to put their skills to the service of the 
community rather than of their own profit only.”23 This is a reference to 
Cohen’s concept of an “egalitarian ethos,” which also features in his critique 
of Rawls. But, as with justificatory community, we should be careful not to 
blur Cohen’s ideas. The ethos contributes towards distributive justice by 
informing people’s choices within society’s coercive rules. For example, in 
Cohen’s “doctor-gardener” illustration, it motivates a naturally talented 
individual who prefers gardening to doctoring for pay consistent with 
responsibility-sensitive equality, but doctoring to gardening at a certain rate 
of unequalizing incentives, to nevertheless refuse unequalizing incentives for 
doctoring, because if she accepted those incentives she would be acting 
contrary to her luck egalitarian belief that differences of natural ability fail to 
justify differences in people’s distributive shares.24 Yet, as Jonathan Quong 
argues, contrary to how it is sometimes interpreted, in itself the egalitarian 
ethos “does not require talented people to choose any particular occupation—
it merely forbids talented people (subject to a limited agent-centered 
prerogative) from accepting unequalizing incentives for taking on socially 
optimal jobs.”25 Choosing those jobs whilst forgoing unequalizing incentives 
further requires the talented to internalize what Cohen variously speaks of as 
“an obligation to serve others,” or “a desire to contribute to society,” or a 
“sense of commitment to other people.”26 It is this productive ethos in 
combination with her luck egalitarianism that motivates doctor-gardener to 
make the socially optimal choice. 
Is the productive ethos constitutive of the community principle? 
Possibly, but Cohen’s descriptions of it appear to resemble communal 
reciprocity more than his illustrations of its first mode of caring. Moreover, 
the egalitarian-productive ethos is primarily intended as a means to ensure 
both distributive justice and efficiency without having to restrict freedom of 
occupational choice. The first mode of caring targets none of those ends. It is 
instead a means to the realization of a shared common life, from which people 
                                                 
23 Miriam Ronzoni, “Life is not a camping trip – on the desirability of Cohenite 
socialism,” in Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 11:2 (2012), 173. 
24 See Cohen, Rescuiing Justice and Equality, 183-196. 
25 Jonathan Quong, “Justice Beyond Equality,” in Social Theory and Practice, 36:2 (2010), 
327. 
26 Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, 190. 
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might nevertheless be cut off in a society whose members internalize the 
ethos, since a commitment to responsibility-sensitive equality and to 
performing socially optimal labor does not rule out large regrettable choice 
and/or option luck inequalities. A world in which doctor-gardener chooses 
doctoring consistent with a luck egalitarian pay scheme may nevertheless be 
a world in which she chooses to bet big on a throw of the dice, and, if she 
loses, perhaps comes to regret that choice. 
What is clear is that the central requirement of the community 
principle “is that people care about, and, where necessary and possible, care 
for, one another, and, too, care that they care about one another.”27 This leaves 
open the possibility of democratically enforcing the constraint on inequality. 
First, note that people might care about one another, in the sense that they are 
concerned about one another’s welfare, yet, where necessary and possible, 
not actually do anything to care for one another. Second, if people do care for 
one another, they might do so only because they are forced to, for example, 
through social welfare programs funded by general taxation. Third, people 
might care that they care about one another, and thus vote for forms of enforced 
caring, such as that just mentioned, or care for one another in an entirely non-
coerced way, for example, by voluntarily sharing resources, or some 
combination of both. Communal reciprocity would also reflect this 
commitment to others, but, as noted previously, it is not a necessary condition 
of the constraint. The central requirement of the community principle does 
not therefore rule out a democratic decision to enforce its first mode of caring. 
As Pablo Gilabert notes, Cohen himself appears to envisage enforcement 
when he speaks of the community principle as “forbidding” the relevant 
inequalities.28 
 
The Abandonment Objection 
 
If the community constraint is voluntary, then the tendency for 
human beings to act selfishly is a significant practical problem. Unless 
resources are so abundant that people have no reason to compete for greater 
distributive shares, only moderate levels of selfishness render it probable that 
levels of voluntary resource sharing and abstinence from option luck would 
fall short of establishing a common life. More importantly, if it is voluntary, 
the constraint does not guarantee security against absolute forms of 
deprivation that might follow from people’s imprudent decisions, since levels 
of voluntary caring might also fall short in that regard. A voluntary 
community constraint thus fails as a response to perhaps the most forceful 
                                                 
27 Cohen, Why Not Socialism? 34-35. 
28 Gilabert, “Cohen on Socialism, Equality and Community,” 109 n. 14; see Cohen, Why 
Not Socialism? 12, 37. 
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“democratic egalitarian” objection to luck egalitarianism, which is that it 
denies some citizens the social conditions of their effective freedom by 
countenancing the “abandonment of negligent victims.”29 For those 
unfamiliar with this objection, consider the paradigm example of the 
uninsured reckless driver:30 
Imagine a person who, against a background of equal opportunities, 
makes a genuine choice to drive recklessly without health insurance. This 
person then goes on to have an accident that leaves her severely injured. If 
she receives expensive medical treatment she will make a full recovery, but 
she cannot afford to pay for it due to her lack of insurance, and the 
consequence of non-treatment would be severe physical and/or mental 
impairment. A strict luck egalitarian sees no distributive injustice in society 
not covering the costs, since the driver’s misfortune is a case of bad option 
luck. Socialist equality of opportunity therefore permits the abandonment of 
imprudent people to absolute forms of deprivation, whether it is severe 
physical and/or mental impairment, as in cases such as this, or abject poverty, 
as in cases where people make genuine choices to gamble their income and 
wealth and lose to that end. 
Abandoning especially imprudent people to deprivation would, of 
course, at least in a moderately wealthy society, cut them off from a shared 
common life with the better off. As we have seen, Cohen deems this outcome 
repugnant if it could be corrected by sharing resources, or if it could have 
been averted by avoidance of the gamble. Victims of bad option luck would 
not therefore be abandoned to absolute forms of deprivation in an ideal 
Cohenite socialist world where the community constraint is voluntarily 
implemented; although it is important to remember that in this world its 
implementation is not a requirement of justice, since Cohen understands the 
constraint as either “defin[ing] the terms within which justice will operate, or 
[as] … sometimes (justifiably?) contradict[ing] justice.”31  
But what if, as is more probable, selfishness thwarts the voluntary 
implementation of the community principle’s first mode of caring? Cohenite 
socialists might insist that in this world their preferred socialism is 
unrealized, and so it cannot be criticized for abandoning negligent victims. 
However, despite Cohen’s thesis that the principles at the summit of our 
normative beliefs do not respond to and are therefore not grounded in facts, 
                                                 
29 See Elizabeth S. Anderson, “What Is the Point of Equality?” in Ethics, 109:2 (1999), 
295-296; Samuel Scheffler, “What is Egalitarianism?” in Philosophy & Public Affairs, 31:1 (2003), 
18-19; Samuel Scheffler, “Choice, circumstance, and the value of equality,” in Politics, Philosophy 
& Economics, 4:1 (2005), 15. 
30 See Anderson, “What Is the Point of Equality?” 295-296; Marc Fleurbaey, “Equal 
Opportunity or Equal Social Outcome,” in Economics and Philosophy, 11:1 (1995), 40-41. 
31 Cohen, Why Not Socialism? 37. 
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the tendency for human beings to act selfishly is a fact that surely counts 
against a voluntary community constraint.32 After all, Cohen’s aim is to 
defend both a desirable and feasible alternative to capitalism, which is why he 
too considers the problem of selfishness. As he understands it, the problem is 
not primarily one of human nature but of economic design, because “while 
we know how to make an economic system work on the basis of the 
development, and, indeed, the hypertrophy, of selfishness, we do not know 
how to make it work by developing and exploiting human generosity.”33 The 
feasibility of a voluntary community constraint given the probability of 
selfishness is therefore a valid consideration, and this consideration has 
implications for its desirability. It is undesirable under the probable 
conditions because it would not guarantee security against deprivation that 
is permitted by socialist equality of opportunity. In contrast, an economic 
design that includes enforcing that security, as the outcome of a democratic 
decision-making procedure that reflects communal caring, is both feasible 
and desirable. 
An alternative strategy that might be employed by defenders of a 
voluntary community constraint is to argue that the abandonment objection 
reveals a problem with socialist equality of opportunity, whilst insisting that 
the community principle is not meant to solve that problem. On this view, the 
desirability of Cohenite socialism depends on revising its egalitarian 
principle rather than its community principle. However, the community 
principle’s first mode of caring is, at least indirectly, meant to deal with the 
abandonment objection, for it seeks to mitigate the same inequalities that the 
objection highlights as unacceptable to leave unmitigated. Unless resources 
are particularly scarce, mitigating option luck inequalities to the extent that a 
shared common life obtains will provide the imprudent with enough to avoid 
deprivation, and if resources are moderately plentiful, it will allocate them 
significantly more than enough. For example, let us imagine that the situation 
of the campers who lose the fishpond lottery is so dire that they struggle to 
satisfy their basic needs of subsistence. If the campers, because they value a 
shared common life, had instead prohibited the lottery and agreed to 
common ownership of the pond, or if the lottery winner had instead sought 
to re-establish a common life after the fact by sharing the pond, an indirect 
consequence, assuming the fishpond is adequately to plentifully stocked, 
would be either the prevention of unnecessary suffering or the rescue of 
imprudent people from it. Hence, the community principle’s first mode of 
caring is an indirect response to the abandonment objection, although one 
that is unsatisfactory if it is voluntary. 
                                                 
32 For the relevant thesis, see Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, 232-233. 
33 Cohen, Why Not Socialism? 58. 
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Contrary to Cohenite socialism, abandoning negligent victims to 
deprivation does not only seem objectionable because it reflects a lack of 
communal caring, it also seems intuitively unjust. If that intuition is not 
mistaken, it follows that luck egalitarianism is either an implausible or 
incomplete theory of distributive justice. In response to the abandonment 
objection, it is common to reach the latter conclusion and propose 
supplementing luck egalitarianism with a sufficiency principle that tempers 
its emphasis on responsibility.34 On this view, justice does not require holding 
people responsible for the consequences of their genuine choices if it means 
denying them a sufficient distributive share, but it does require distributive 
shares to be responsibility-sensitive above a guaranteed minimum. Paula 
Casal maintains that this mixed view of justice is not incoherent, as the 
intermittent role of responsibility in determining just shares can be explained 
by the fact that forbidding choice-generated inequality would require severe 
restrictions on liberty, whereas forbidding choice-generated insufficiency 
tends to require less costly restrictions on liberty.35 
A particularly forceful justification of a sufficiency constraint, which 
is open to luck egalitarians to adopt, is to ground it in a liberal democratic 
interpretation of social contract theory. On this view, citizens are owed what 
they require to participate fully in a democratic society in return for 
consenting to the authority of the state, and they act collectively through the 
state to fulfill each person’s entitlements.36 In Elizabeth Anderson’s seminal 
theory of “democratic equality,” this is fleshed out in terms of entitlements to 
capabilities necessary to avoid oppressive social relationships and for 
functioning as an equal citizen. Functioning as an equal citizen involves the 
ability to effectively exercise one’s political rights and to participate in the 
various activities of civil society, which presupposes effective access to the 
means of subsistence and human agency. To illustrate, if one does not have 
sufficient food, clothes, shelter, healthcare, and an adequate education that 
enables her to make informed choices, she cannot effectively exercise her 
right to vote or to engage in public deliberation, nor can she participate as an 
equal in a system of cooperative production, nor might she have effective 
access to public transport, and thus to certain public spaces, nor might she 
                                                 
34 See Nicholas Barry, “Defending Luck Egalitarianism,” in Journal of Applied 
Philosophy, 23:1 (2006); Alexander Brown, “Luck Egalitarianism and Democratic Equality,” in 
Ethical Perspectives, 12:3 (2005); Paula Casal, “Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough,” in Ethics, 117:2 
(2007); Andrew Williams, “Liberty, Equality, and Property,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Theory, ed. by John S. Dryzek, Bonnie Honig and Anne Phillips (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006). 
35 Casal, “Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough,” 322. 
36 See Anderson, “What Is the Point of Equality?” 314-315; Barry, “Defending Luck 
Egalitarianism,” 100. 
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even be able to appear in public without shame.37 Democratic equality thus 
“requires that everyone have effective access to enough resources to avoid 
being oppressed by others and to function as an equal in civil society.”38 
Nevertheless, Cohenite socialists might insist that distributive justice 
does not require sufficiency, whilst still viewing the abandonment of 
imprudent people to deprivation repugnant on the basis that it reflects a lack 
of caring that cuts people off from a shared common life. Moreover, as the 
central requirement of the community principle does not rule out democratic 
enforcement of its first mode of caring, Cohenite socialists might opt for this 
measure given the undesirability of a voluntary community constraint in a 
selfish world. The problem, however, is that enforcing the community 
constraint appears to involve unjustified restrictions on liberty. This becomes 
evident after further distinguishing how it goes beyond sufficientarianism. 
 
The Liberty Objection 
 
The community constraint on luck egalitarianism varies in degree 
compared with a sufficiency constraint. Regarding the latter, it is plausible 
that everyone could have effective access to enough resources to avoid 
deprivation, oppression and to function as equal citizens in a democratic 
society that is characterized by large inequalities of resources. Inequalities of 
resources would be troubling for democratic equality if the consequence were 
that the ability of people to function as equal citizens were undermined, such 
as if the inequalities effectively enabled the wealthy to select candidates for 
public office. When democratic egalitarian concerns are built into a 
sufficiency constraint it might therefore require minding the gap. But it does 
not necessarily require it, since, on this view, “[t]he stronger the barriers 
against commodifying social status, political influence, and the like, the more 
acceptable are significant income inequalities.”39 It therefore permits large 
inequalities of resources if the state successfully prevents their conversion 
into effectively unequal citizenship. 
In contrast, the community constraint does necessarily require 
minding the gap, as it requires that the worst off do not face significantly 
more challenges in life than the best off. To emphasize the distinction. On the 
one hand, supplementing luck egalitarianism with a sufficiency constraint 
necessarily keeps responsibility-sensitive inequalities of resources within any 
range except where distributive shares at the bottom end of the scale are insufficient. 
On the other hand, supplementing luck egalitarianism with the community 
constraint necessarily keeps certain responsibility-sensitive inequalities of 
                                                 
37 Anderson, “What Is the Point of Equality?” 316-321. 
38 Ibid., 320. 
39 Ibid., 326. 
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resources within a limited range where the top and bottom ends of the scale are 
narrowed by the goal of establishing a shared common life. For example, imagine 
that a tenfold income inequality exists between us, not because of any 
inequality of opportunity, but because of my regrettable choices and/or bad 
option luck. Your income is $350,000 a year and my income is $35,000 a year. 
If $35,000 is sufficient for the satisfaction of my basic needs and for me to 
function as an equal citizen, the requirements of luck egalitarianism 
supplemented with a democratic egalitarian sufficiency constraint are 
satisfied. On the contrary, the requirements of Cohenite socialism are not 
satisfied. Other things equal, I will face significantly more challenges in life 
than you, due to the considerable difference in our economic power. If the 
community constraint were enforced your greater resources would instead 
be shared to the extent that I do not face many more challenges in life than 
you, or the inequality of resources would have never arisen because of 
restrictions on option luck, or some combination of both. The community 
constraint thus requires greater equalization of certain responsibility-
sensitive inequalities of resources. It necessarily forbids large regrettable 
choice and/or option luck inequalities, whereas a sufficiency constraint does 
not. 
Enforcing either constraint, to borrow terms from Andrew Williams, 
would require “internalizing” and/or “externalizing” of its costs. 
Internalizing costs would involve restricting people’s liberty to participate in 
option luck, for example, by enforcing special taxes, compulsory insurance 
and/or prohibition of reckless activities, to the degree necessary to realize 
either sufficiency or a shared common life. Externalizing costs would instead 
involve spreading liability for people’s regrettable choices and/or bad option 
luck across society by means of general taxation, again, to the degree 
necessary to realize either constraint.40 
Internalizing and externalizing the costs of a sufficiency constraint on 
luck egalitarianism can be justified on the contractualist grounds explained 
above. Of the two methods of enforcement, internalizing might be preferable 
to externalizing, since externalizing the costs of sufficiency would involve, if 
not injustice, at least unfairness. That is to say, even if justice requires 
sufficiency, when differences of outcome reflect only people’s genuine 
choices made against a background of equal opportunities, there is 
nevertheless an unfairness involved in forcing prudent people to bear the 
costs of correcting for imprudent people’s insufficiency. That is not to say, 
however, that externalizing the costs of sufficiency is unjustified. As it might 
be preferable, all things considered, to collectively fulfill each person’s 
entitlements by spreading liability for people’s regrettable choices and/or bad 
                                                 
40 Williams, “Liberty, Equality, and Property,” 501-502. 
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option luck across society, rather than restrict people’s liberty to participate 
in option luck, or some combination of both. 
In contrast, both internalizing and externalizing the potentially 
greater costs of the community constraint on luck egalitarianism seems 
unjustified. Consider again the case above where a tenfold responsibility-
sensitive income inequality cuts us off from a shared common life, but where 
my income is sufficient. Should the state have forbidden this outcome by 
internalizing the costs of the community constraint? That is to ask, should we 
have collectively placed restrictions on our liberty to participate in option 
luck, for example, by enforcing special taxes, compulsory insurance and/or 
prohibition of reckless activities to the necessary degree? Whereas restrictions 
on liberty of this sort can be justified if they are necessary, which they are not 
in this case, to the degree required to guarantee our sufficiency, it is doubtful 
whether the possibility of one of us having to face many more challenges in 
life than the other justifies further restrictions. Remember, the difference of 
outcome reflects only our genuine choices made against a background of 
equal opportunities. Thus, so long as our choices did not have the potential 
to generate insufficiency, and did not, therefore, risk the unfairness involved 
in having to externalize the costs of sufficiency, we have strong claims against 
others restricting our liberty to make those choices. In cases where large 
inequalities of resources are responsibility-sensitive, and where internalizing 
the costs of a shared common life necessitates more severe restrictions on 
liberty than what is required to secure people’s sufficiency, those greater 
restrictions appear unjustified. 
But what about externalizing the costs for us to share in a common 
life? Should we instead have acted collectively to forbid the tenfold income 
inequality that separates us by such means? Suppose that for me not to face 
significantly more challenges in life than you would require redistributing 
$100,000 by means of taxation, so that my income increases from $35,000 to 
$135,000 a year, and your income decreases from $350,000 to $250,000 a year. 
Similar to the problem with internalizing the community constraint, whereas 
taxing you can be justified if it is necessary, which it is not in this case, to 
externalize the costs of my sufficiency, it is doubtful whether the mere fact 
that I would otherwise have to face many more challenges in life than you 
justifies further redistributive taxation. Indeed, I appear to have no claim 
whatsoever to even a small amount of your greater resources, let alone a 
substantial cut of your income, as I have sufficient resources and it is 
reasonable to hold me responsible for my relative disadvantage. Thus, in 
cases where large inequalities of resources are responsibility-sensitive, and 
where externalizing the costs of a shared common life necessitates 
redistributive taxation beyond what is required to secure people’s sufficiency, 
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any further redistributive taxation seems an unjustified restriction on 
people’s liberty over the use of their resources. 
In response to “the liberty objection,” it might be argued that I have 
misinterpreted the community principle’s first mode of caring. This response 
targets and denies the distinction I have drawn between its radically 
egalitarian requirements and the more moderate sufficientarian requirements 
of democratic egalitarianism. On this view, the first mode of caring should be 
interpreted as some kind of sufficiency constraint, which does not therefore 
require the demanding equalization of resources and apparently unjustified 
restrictions on liberty outlined above. 
Gilabert explores a sufficientarian account of the community 
principle. Contrary to Cohen’s view that the restrictions it places on large 
inequalities either define the scope of justice or contradict it, he suggests we 
ought to view them as “more stringent demands of justice … focused on 
sufficientarian concerns with basic needs and on requirements to protect 
equal political status and self-respect.”41 I agree that this is a more plausible 
constraint on luck egalitarianism, but it is a reconstruction of the community 
principle. On Cohen’s view the community principle is not a requirement of 
justice, and realization of its first mode of caring would involve more than 
addressing these sufficientarian concerns. As Gilabert agrees, people 
committed to the first mode of caring “would feel that their communal bonds 
are weakened if some of them turn out to face many more challenges in their 
lives than others due to significant inequalities of income and other material 
advantages.”42 Thus, unlike a sufficiency constraint, which does not 
necessarily prohibit this outcome, establishing a shared common life by 
enforcing the first mode of caring requires that we mind the gap. The 
interpretation of the community constraint that understands it as necessarily 
restricting large regrettable choice and/or option luck inequalities is most 
consistent with Cohen’s view, and supplementing luck egalitarianism by 
enforcing that constraint appears to require unjustified restrictions on liberty. 
 
Equality, Sufficiency, and Community 
 
One solution to both objections is, of course, to reject Cohenite 
socialism in favor of some version of sufficiency-constrained luck 
egalitarianism. However, an alternative solution is to specify that the 
community principle’s first mode of caring requires enforcement of 
sufficiency, but only voluntary equalization of resources thereafter, if it is 
necessary to establish a shared common life. The community constraint 
                                                 
41 Gilabert, “Cohen on Socialism, Equality and Community,” 103. 
42 Ibid., 105. 
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would not then fail to guarantee sufficiency or unjustifiably restrict liberty. 
Consistent with democratic egalitarianism and Gilabert’s reconstruction, its 
enforced component should be rebuilt as a requirement of justice, whilst its 
voluntary component should be understood in terms of acts of caring that go 
beyond justice, and which reflect the broader requirements of community 
that Cohen envisions. As Gilabert appreciates, sufficientarian concerns do not 
exhaust requirements of community, and not all requirements of community 
are requirements of justice.43 
A remaining issue is whether there is any compelling reason to prefer 
supplementing luck egalitarianism with this version of the community 
constraint to a purely sufficientarian alternative. This is beyond the scope of 
the article, but I shall nevertheless finish by noting two possibilities that are 
perhaps worthy of further reflection. 
The first possible reason to prefer it, which is implicit in the bus case, 
concerns the increased opportunities for empathy provided by a shared 
common life. Assuming people are more likely to empathize with one another 
when they encounter similar experiences, and that empathy fosters 
communal caring that helps people to overcome challenges, it follows that 
society loses in that respect when its members have very different experiences 
because of considerable differences in their economic power. If it serves as a 
means to the creation and reinforcement of a more caring society, perhaps 
even a society that is characterized by communal reciprocity or the Marxist 
needs principle, pursuing a shared common life through voluntary resource 
sharing and/or refraining from option luck might therefore be preferable to 
settling only for sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism. 
The second possible reason invokes “the priority view,” but only as 
a view about what would be morally good and not as a view about what 
justice requires. The basic view is that equal improvements in a person’s 
welfare have greater moral value the worse off a person is in absolute terms, 
so that we ought to give priority to improving the welfare of the worst off, 
whilst perhaps allowing that at some stage small gains in welfare for the 
worst off do not outweigh the moral value of large gains (or avoiding large 
loses) in welfare for the better off.44 Accordingly, the voluntary pursuit of a 
shared common life might be preferable to settling only for the enforcement 
of distributive justice, that is, sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism, if it 
serves as a means to improve the lifetime welfare of the worst off, and if those 
gains outweigh the moral value of avoiding the losses in lifetime welfare 
shouldered by the better off. 
                                                 
43 Ibid., 108. 
44 Derek Parfit, “Equality or Priority?” in The Ideal of Equality, ed. by Matthew Clayton 
and Andrew Williams (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 101, 105. 
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However, the moral importance of empathy motivated altruism and 
of improving the lifetime welfare of the worst off is greatly diminished when 
the worst off enjoy and are guaranteed sufficiency, and when the relative 
disadvantage they experience above that threshold is responsibility-sensitive. 
Thus, even if there are reasons to prefer the specified community constraint 
to a purely sufficientarian alternative, I am somewhat skeptical about the 
force of the noted possibilities.45 
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